jwt lib-a — RFC 7519 JSON Web Tokenak (HS256) eta ChaCha20-Poly1305 Token Zifratuak

34.1. Zergatik existitzen da jwt lib-a? (Benetako arazoa eta Ridgun filosofia)

«Zergatik behar dut jwt lib bat hutsetik Ridgun hutsean idatzia, betiko C liburutegi bat estekatu beharrean?»

Hori da edozein sistema-ingeniarik jwt-era iristean egiten duen lehen galdera. Eta erantzunak ridgun-libs-en filosofia osoa laburbiltzen du:

Izan gaitezen zintzoak: JWT ekosistema ospetsua da erasotzaile batek goiburua "alg":"none"-ra aldatzen duen eta zerbitzariak tokena sinadurarik gabe onartzen duen ahultasunengatik, edo payload-a Base64url-n kodetuta baino ez dagoela ahaztuta informazio sentikorra gordetzeagatik.

jwt lib-ak bi munduak konpontzen ditu: RFC 7519 (HS256) JWTak sinatu eta egiaztatzen ditu alg == "HS256" esplizituki eskatuz, HMACa denbora konstantean konparatuz eta exp/nbf baliozkotuz, eta gainera token seal / token open eskaintzen ditu ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD bidez zifratutako token opakuak jaulkitzeko.

Ekosistema tradizional batean, JWT domeinuko zereginak ebazteak C-ko kanpo-mendekotasunak arrastatzea, erakusle gordinekin borrokatzea, mota-bihurketa opakuak, egiaztatu gabeko salbuespenak edo zabor-biltzailearen geldialdi ustekabekoak jasatea dakar. Ridgunen, jwt lib-ak (src/main/ridgun/lib/jwt.rg) lau printzipio negoziatu ezinekin heltzen dio arazoari:

1. Deklaratu import jwt (edo import jwt as alias) fitxategiaren hasieran: lib bakoitzak module :: jwt izen-espazioa definitzen du eta --strict moduan hitz anitzeko funtzioei zuriune naturalekin deitzen zaie beti.
2. Kateatu zure datu-hodiak ezkerretik eskuinera -> bidez: idatzi sarrera lehen urratsa -> bigarren urratsa -> emaitza, erabili (+ _ _ +) maskarak sekuentziak desegituratzeko eta kendu _ = sententzia sekuentzialetan (edo baztertu -> () bidez).
3. Isats-errekurtsioa TCOrekin (Tail-Call Optimization): jwt-eko barne-ibilbide guztiak $O(1)$ pila-espazioko begizta natiboetara konpilatzen dira.
4. Memoria determinista (RMM1 / RMM2): tarteko egitura bakoitza bere azken irakurketa amaitzen den une zehatzean askatzen da, Garbage Collector gabe.

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34.2. Artefaktu natiboak, inportazioa eta jwt APIaren katalogo osoa

ridgun-libs-en, jwt lehen mailako lib bat da, src/main/ridgun/lib/jwt.rg bidean kokatua (JWT domeinua). stable bundle-ekin konpilatzean, hiru formatu natibotan paketatzen da:

Artefaktua	Bidea	Helburua
Ridgun Bundle-a	target/bundles/jwt.rglib	Banaketa eta inportazio zuzena import jwt bidez
Fitxategi konpilatua	target/jwt.rgc	ridgunc-ek egiaztatutako tarteko artefaktua
ELF64 objektu partekatua	target/libjwt.so	C edo libc mendekotasunik gabeko liburutegi dinamiko natiboa

Lib bakoitzak bere izen-espazioa deklaratzen du module :: jwt bidez: nahikoa da goiburuan import jwt (edo import jwt as alias) idaztea eta bere funtzioei zuriune naturalekin (nire funtzioa x) eta -> hodiekin (x nire funtzioa -> emaitza) deitzea.

34.2.1. jwt-eko familia funtzionalen laburpena

Sinadura / Funtzioa / Mota	Zer egiten duen eta noiz erabili
type JwtResult	`JwtOk JsonVal
jwt sign hs256 / jwt verify hs256	JsonVal claim-ak sinatzen ditu eta sinadura + alg == "HS256" + exp/nbf egiaztatzen ditu
jwt claims / jwt get str / jwt get int	(sub, iss, iat, exp) claim estandarrak eraiki eta egiaztatutako payload-ak kontsultatzen ditu
token seal / token open	JSON token opakuak zifratu eta autentifikatzen ditu ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD bidez

34.2.2. src/main/ridgun/lib/jwt.rg-eko mota eta sinadura guztien katalogoa

Jarraian duzu src/main/ridgun/lib/jwt.rg fitxategian definitutako mota aljebraiko (type), eragile (op ::) eta funtzio-sinadura (fn ::) guztien inbentario osoa (3 mota, 0 eragile eta 55 funtzio):

jwt-eko mota aljebraikoak eta erregistroak (type):

type JwtClaims = issuer: String, subject: String, expires_at: Int, not_before_at: Int, custom_json: String
type JwtRes = JwtOk String | JwtErr String
type JwtClaimsRes = JwtClaimsOk JwtClaims | JwtClaimsErr String

#	Funtzioa / Sinadura (fn ::)	Itzulera-mota
1	fn :: jwt b64url lut Int	String
2	fn :: jwt b64 char Int	String
3	fn :: jwt b64 val Int	Int
4	fn :: jwt b64url enc bytes [Int]	String
5	fn :: jwt str to bytes loop String Int Int [Int]	[Int]
6	fn :: jwt str to bytes String	[Int]
7	fn :: jwt bytes to str [Int]	String
8	fn :: jwt b64url encode String	String
9	fn :: jwt b64url valid loop String Int Int	Bool
10	fn :: jwt b64url is valid String	Bool
11	fn :: jwt b64url dec rem String Int Int	[Int]
12	fn :: jwt b64url dec 3 String Int	[Int]
13	fn :: jwt b64url dec 4 String Int	[Int]
14	fn :: jwt b64url decode bytes String	[Int]
15	fn :: jwt b64url decode String	String
16	fn :: jwt bxor loop Int Int Int Int	Int
17	fn :: jwt byte xor Int Int	Int
18	fn :: jwt ct diff String String Int Int Int	Int
19	fn :: jwt ct eq String String	Bool
20	fn :: jwt hex nib Int	Int
21	fn :: jwt hex to bytes loop String Int Int [Int]	[Int]
22	fn :: jwt hex to bytes String	[Int]
23	fn :: jwt pad key bytes [Int] Int	[Int]
24	fn :: jwt pad key head [Int] Int	[Int]
25	fn :: jwt key block String	[Int]
26	fn :: jwt xor pad str [Int] Int	String
27	fn :: jwt hmac sha256 b64url String String	String
28	fn :: jwt hs256 header json Int	String
29	fn :: jwt sign hs256 String String	String
30	fn :: jwt split dots loop String Int Int Int [String]	[String]
31	fn :: jwt str list len [String]	Int
32	fn :: jwt str at [String] Int	String
33	fn :: jwt decode payload String	JwtRes
34	fn :: jwt decode parts [String]	JwtRes
35	fn :: jwt header is hs256 String	Bool
36	fn :: jwt check hdr json JsonRes	Bool
37	fn :: jwt verify hs256 String String	JwtRes
38	fn :: jwt verify parts [String] String	JwtRes
39	fn :: jwt verify sig String String String String	JwtRes
40	fn :: jwt verify sig ct Bool String	JwtRes
41	fn :: jwt sign claims JwtClaims String	String
42	fn :: jwt verify claims String String Int	JwtClaimsRes
43	fn :: jwt validate verified payload JwtRes Int	JwtClaimsRes
44	fn :: jwt validate parsed claims JsonRes Int	JwtClaimsRes
45	fn :: jwt check claim times JwtClaims Int	JwtClaimsRes
46	fn :: jwt keystream bytes String String Int Int	[Int]
47	fn :: jwt xor lists [Int] [Int]	[Int]
48	fn :: jwt seal aead String String String	JwtRes
49	fn :: jwt seal aead ok String String String	JwtRes
50	fn :: jwt open aead String String String	JwtRes
51	fn :: jwt open aead parts String String [String]	JwtRes
52	fn :: jwt open aead verify String String String String String	JwtRes
53	fn :: jwt open aead decrypt Bool String String String	JwtRes
54	fn :: jwt int list len [Int]	Int
55	fn :: jwt open aead pt String String [Int]	JwtRes

---

34.3. jwt sakonki esploratzen: Funtzionalitate bakoitzaren urratsez urratseko adibideak

Ez da nahikoa sinadura-taula ikustea: jwt lib-aren funtzionalitate bakoitza Ridgunen exekutagarriak diren adibide progresiboen bidez esploratuko dugu. Eguneroko bi errezeta taularatuekin hasiko gara eta ondoren xehetasunez ikusiko ditugu src/test/ridgun/test jwt.rg-en egiaztatutako agertoki funtzional eta muga-kasu guztiak.

34.3.1. 1. adibidea: Fluxu nagusia estilo taularatuan jwt erabiliz

Ikusi nola Ridgunen = ikurrak eta jwt bidezko eraldaketa-urratsak taula garbi bat bezala lerrokatuta geratzen diren, beharrezkoak ez diren aldagai aldakorrik edo ezkutuko albo-ondoriorik gabe:

import jwt

fn :: emitir y verificar sesion String => String String
      emitir y verificar sesion secreto =
        [("sub", "user-42"), ("iss", "solstice"), ("exp", "1700003600")] -> claims
        jwt sign hs256 claims secreto -> tok
        jwt verify and get tok secreto 1700001000 "sub" -> sub
        (tok, sub)

34.3.2. 2. adibidea: Konposizio segurua eta muga-kasuen kudeaketa

jwt lib-eko funtzio oro | guarda boolearrekin eta ridgun-libs-eko gainerako 32 lib-ekin konposatzeko diseinatuta dago:

import jwt

fn :: sellar token confidencial String => Int String
      sellar token confidencial clave =
        [("rol", "root"), ("pin", "9988")] -> claims
        jwt encrypt aead claims clave "nonce-12byte" "solstice" -> sobre
        jwt decrypt aead sobre clave "solstice" 1700001000

34.3.3. 3. adibidea: JWT HS256 sinadura eta egiaztapena (jwt sign hs256, jwt verify hs256), alg: none erasoaren ukapena eta sinadura-manipulazioaren detekzioa

Adibide praktiko honetan jwt bloke funtzional honetan nola portatzen den sakonki aztertzen dugu, sarrera estandarrak, parametro-konbinazioak eta muga-balioak barne:

fn :: test jwt hs256 sign verify and tamper => ()
      test jwt hs256 sign verify and tamper =
        payload = '{"sub":"user-42","role":"admin"}'
        secret = "super-secret-hmac-key-2026"
        tok = jwt sign hs256 payload secret

        dec = jwt decode payload tok
        assert true (is jwt ok dec) "AC1: jwt decode payload succeeds"
        assert str eq (unwrap jwt dec) payload "AC1: decoded payload matches input"

        ver = jwt verify hs256 tok secret
        assert true (is jwt ok ver) "AC2: jwt verify hs256 accepts valid signature"
        assert str eq (unwrap jwt ver) payload "AC2: verified payload matches input"

        wrong_sec = jwt verify hs256 tok "wrong-secret"
        assert false (is jwt ok wrong_sec) "AC2: jwt verify hs256 rejects wrong secret"
        assert false (is jwt ok (jwt verify hs256 tok "")) "AC2: jwt verify hs256 rejects empty secret"

        tampered = tok + "x"
        assert false (is jwt ok (jwt verify hs256 tampered secret)) "AC2: jwt verify hs256 rejects tampered signature"

        -- CVE/RFC 8725 attacks: alg:none, empty signature segment, malformed segment counts
        alg_none_tok = "eyJhbGciOiJub25lIiwidHlwIjoiSldUIn0.eyJzdWIiOiJ1c2VyLTQyIn0.c2ln"
        assert false (is jwt ok (jwt verify hs256 alg_none_tok secret)) "AC2: jwt verify hs256 rejects alg:none"
        alg_none_empty_sig = "eyJhbGciOiJub25lIiwidHlwIjoiSldUIn0.eyJzdWIiOiJ1c2VyLTQyIn0."
        assert false (is jwt ok (jwt verify hs256 alg_none_empty_sig secret)) "AC2: jwt verify hs256 rejects empty signature"
        assert false (is jwt ok (jwt verify hs256 "only_one_segment" secret)) "AC2: reject 1-segment token"
        assert false (is jwt ok (jwt verify hs256 "two.segments" secret)) "AC2: reject 2-segment token"
        assert false (is jwt ok (jwt decode payload "bad_token_without_dots")) "AC1: decode rejects token without 3 segments"
        ()

34.3.4. 4. adibidea: Egituratutako claim-en denbora-baliozkotzea (JwtClaims: iss, sub, aud, exp, nbf, iat, jti) jwt validate claims bidez

Adibide praktiko honetan jwt bloke funtzional honetan nola portatzen den sakonki aztertzen dugu, sarrera estandarrak, parametro-konbinazioak eta muga-balioak barne:

fn :: test jwt claims temporal validation => ()
      test jwt claims temporal validation =
        claims = JwtClaims "ridgun-auth" "agent-007" 2000 1000 "tier=gold"
        secret = "claims-signing-secret"
        tok = jwt sign claims claims secret

        -- Exact nbf boundary: now == 1000 is valid (now >= nbf)
        at_nbf_res = jwt verify claims tok secret 1000
        assert true (is claims ok at_nbf_res) "AC2: claims valid at exact nbf boundary (now == 1000)"

        ok_res = jwt verify claims tok secret 1500
        assert true (is claims ok ok_res) "AC2: claims valid at now=1500"
        c_out = unwrap claims ok_res
        assert str eq (issuer c_out) "ridgun-auth" "AC2: issuer preserved"
        assert str eq (subject c_out) "agent-007" "AC2: subject preserved"
        assert int equals (expires_at c_out) 2000 "AC2: expires_at preserved"
        assert int equals (not_before_at c_out) 1000 "AC2: not_before_at preserved"
        assert str eq (custom_json c_out) "tier=gold" "AC2: custom_json preserved"

        -- 1 second before exp: now == 1999 is valid
        before_exp_res = jwt verify claims tok secret 1999
        assert true (is claims ok before_exp_res) "AC2: claims valid 1s before exp (1999 < 2000)"

        -- 1 second before nbf: now == 999 is rejected
        early_res = jwt verify claims tok secret 999
        assert false (is claims ok early_res) "AC2: claims rejected before nbf (999 < 1000)"

        -- Exact exp boundary and after: now == 2000 and now == 5000 rejected
        exp_res = jwt verify claims tok secret 2000
        assert false (is claims ok exp_res) "AC2: claims rejected at exact exp (2000 >= 2000)"
        late_res = jwt verify claims tok secret 5000
        assert false (is claims ok late_res) "AC2: claims rejected after exp (5000 >= 2000)"
        assert false (is claims ok (jwt verify claims tok "wrong-secret" 1500)) "AC2: claims rejected with wrong secret"
        ()

34.3.5. 5. adibidea: ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD bidez zifratu eta autentifikatutako tokenak (jwt seal aead, jwt open aead)

Adibide praktiko honetan jwt bloke funtzional honetan nola portatzen den sakonki aztertzen dugu, sarrera estandarrak, parametro-konbinazioak eta muga-balioak barne:

fn :: test jwt aead seal and open => ()
      test jwt aead seal and open =
        key32 = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
        other_key32 = "fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210"
        nonce12 = "uniqueNonce1"
        other_nonce12 = "uniqueNonce2"
        secret_msg = '{"api_key":"rk_live_998877","scope":"full"}'

        sealed = jwt seal aead key32 nonce12 secret_msg
        assert true (is jwt ok sealed) "AC3: jwt seal aead succeeds with 32B key and 12B nonce"
        tok = unwrap jwt sealed

        opened = jwt open aead key32 nonce12 tok
        assert true (is jwt ok opened) "AC3: jwt open aead succeeds"
        assert str eq (unwrap jwt opened) secret_msg "AC3: jwt open aead round-trips plaintext"

        assert false (is jwt ok (jwt open aead other_key32 nonce12 tok)) "AC3: jwt open aead rejects wrong 32B key"
        assert false (is jwt ok (jwt open aead key32 other_nonce12 tok)) "AC3: jwt open aead rejects wrong 12B nonce"
        assert false (is jwt ok (jwt open aead key32 nonce12 (tok + "A"))) "AC3: jwt open aead rejects tampered ciphertext/tag"
        assert false (is jwt ok (jwt seal aead "short" nonce12 secret_msg)) "AC3: jwt seal aead rejects non-32B key"
        assert false (is jwt ok (jwt seal aead key32 "short" secret_msg)) "AC3: jwt seal aead rejects non-12B nonce"
        ()

---

34.4. Kaputaren azpian: nola dagoen eraikia jwt Ridgun hutsean (src/main/ridgun/lib/jwt.rg)

ridgun-libs-en abantaila handienetako bat C-ko kutxa beltzik ez egotea da. src/main/ridgun/lib/jwt.rg ireki dezakezu eta eragiketa bakoitza pattern matching, | / |. guarda-zuhaitzak eta isats-errekurtsioa (TCO) erabiliz nola inplementatuta dagoen irakurri. Ikus ditzagun bere benetako inplementazioaren funtsezko piezak:

34.4.1. Barne-inplementazioa: Byte, Hex, Base64url & Constant-Time Helpers

Ikusi nola jwt.rg-ek lehenik fn :: ... => ... sinadurak egituratzen dituen eta kasu bakoitza lerrokatutako ekuazioen eta isats-deien bidez ebazten duen:

module :: jwt

fn :: jwt b64url lut Int => String
      jwt b64url lut _ = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789-_"

fn :: jwt b64 char Int => String
      jwt b64 char idx =
        jwt b64url lut 0 -> tbl
        ((idx % 64) + 64) % 64 -> i
        str slice tbl i (i + 1)

fn :: jwt b64 val Int => Int
      jwt b64 val c =
        | c >= 65 and c <= 90 = c - 65
        | c >= 97 and c <= 122 = (c - 97) + 26
        | c >= 48 and c <= 57 = (c - 48) + 52
        | c == 45 or c == 43 = 62
        | c == 95 or c == 47 = 63
        | otherwise = (0 - 1)

fn :: jwt b64url enc bytes [Int] => String
      jwt b64url enc bytes [] = ""
      jwt b64url enc bytes (b0:[]) = (jwt b64 char (b0 / 4)) + (jwt b64 char ((b0 % 4) * 16))
      jwt b64url enc bytes (b0:b1:[]) =
        (b0 * 256) + b1 -> n
        (jwt b64 char (n / 1024)) + (jwt b64 char ((n / 16) % 64)) + (jwt b64 char ((n % 16) * 4))
      jwt b64url enc bytes (b0:b1:b2:rs) =
        (b0 * 65536) + (b1 * 256) + b2 -> n
        (jwt b64 char (n / 262144)) + (jwt b64 char ((n / 4096) % 64)) + (jwt b64 char ((n / 64) % 64)) + (jwt b64 char (n % 64)) + (jwt b64url enc bytes rs)

fn :: jwt str to bytes loop String Int Int [Int] => [Int]
      jwt str to bytes loop s pos len acc =
        | pos >= len = acc
        | otherwise = jwt str to bytes loop s (pos + 1) len (acc :: [((str char at s pos) % 256 + 256) % 256])

fn :: jwt str to bytes String => [Int]
      jwt str to bytes s = jwt str to bytes loop s 0 (str len s) []

fn :: jwt bytes to str [Int] => String
      jwt bytes to str [] = ""
      jwt bytes to str (b:rest) = (char from code b) + (jwt bytes to str rest)

fn :: jwt b64url encode String => String
      jwt b64url encode s = s jwt str to bytes -> jwt b64url enc bytes

fn :: jwt b64url valid loop String Int Int => Bool
      jwt b64url valid loop s pos len =
        | pos >= len = True
        | (jwt b64 val (str char at s pos)) < 0 = False
        | otherwise = jwt b64url valid loop s (pos + 1) len

fn :: jwt b64url is valid String => Bool
      jwt b64url is valid s =
        | ((str len s) % 4) == 1 = False
        | otherwise = jwt b64url valid loop s 0 (str len s)

fn :: jwt b64url dec rem String Int Int => [Int]
      jwt b64url dec rem s pos rem =
        | rem <= 1 = []
        | rem == 2 = [(((jwt b64 val (str char at s pos)) * 4) + ((jwt b64 val (str char at s (pos + 1))) / 16)) % 256]
        | rem == 3 = jwt b64url dec3 s pos
        | otherwise = (jwt b64url dec4 s pos) :: (jwt b64url dec rem s (pos + 4) (rem - 4))

fn :: jwt b64url dec3 String Int => [Int]
      jwt b64url dec3 s pos =
        jwt b64 val (str char at s pos) -> v0
        jwt b64 val (str char at s (pos + 1)) -> v1
        jwt b64 val (str char at s (pos + 2)) -> v2
        (v0 * 1024) + (v1 * 16) + (v2 / 4) -> n
        [(n / 256) % 256, n % 256]

fn :: jwt b64url dec4 String Int => [Int]
      jwt b64url dec4 s pos =
        jwt b64 val (str char at s pos) -> v0
        jwt b64 val (str char at s (pos + 1)) -> v1
        jwt b64 val (str char at s (pos + 2)) -> v2
        jwt b64 val (str char at s (pos + 3)) -> v3
        (v0 * 262144) + (v1 * 4096) + (v2 * 64) + v3 -> n
        [(n / 65536) % 256, (n / 256) % 256, n % 256]

fn :: jwt b64url decode bytes String => [Int]
      jwt b64url decode bytes s = jwt b64url dec rem s 0 (str len s)

fn :: jwt b64url decode String => String
      jwt b64url decode s = s jwt b64url decode bytes -> jwt bytes to str

34.4.2. Barne-inplementazioa: Constant-Time Equality & Bitwise XOR

Ikusi nola jwt.rg-ek lehenik fn :: ... => ... sinadurak egituratzen dituen eta kasu bakoitza lerrokatutako ekuazioen eta isats-deien bidez ebazten duen:

fn :: jwt bxor loop Int Int Int Int => Int
      jwt bxor loop _ _ 0 acc = acc
      jwt bxor loop a b bit acc =
        | ((a % 2) != (b % 2)) = jwt bxor loop (a / 2) (b / 2) (bit * 2) (acc + bit)
        | otherwise = jwt bxor loop (a / 2) (b / 2) (bit * 2) acc

fn :: jwt byte bxor Int Int => Int
      jwt byte bxor a b = jwt bxor loop (((a % 256) + 256) % 256) (((b % 256) + 256) % 256) 1 0

fn :: jwt ct diff String String Int Int Int => Int
      jwt ct diff a b idx len acc =
        | idx >= len = acc
        | otherwise = jwt ct diff a b (idx + 1) len (acc + (jwt byte bxor (str char at a idx) (str char at b idx)))

fn :: jwt ct eq String String => Bool
      jwt ct eq a b =
        | (str len a) != (str len b) = False
        | otherwise = (jwt ct diff a b 0 (str len a) 0) == 0

34.4.3. Barne-inplementazioa: HS256 (HMAC-SHA256) Signing & Verification

Ikusi nola jwt.rg-ek lehenik fn :: ... => ... sinadurak egituratzen dituen eta kasu bakoitza lerrokatutako ekuazioen eta isats-deien bidez ebazten duen:

fn :: jwt hex nib Int => Int
      jwt hex nib c =
        | c >= 48 and c <= 57 = c - 48
        | c >= 97 and c <= 102 = (c - 97) + 10
        | c >= 65 and c <= 70 = (c - 65) + 10
        | otherwise = 0

fn :: jwt hex to bytes loop String Int Int [Int] => [Int]
      jwt hex to bytes loop h pos len acc =
        | (pos + 1) >= len = acc
        | otherwise = jwt hex to bytes loop h (pos + 2) len (acc :: [((jwt hex nib (str char at h pos)) * 16) + (jwt hex nib (str char at h (pos + 1)))])

fn :: jwt hex to bytes String => [Int]
      jwt hex to bytes h = jwt hex to bytes loop h 0 (str len h) []

fn :: jwt pad key bytes [Int] Int => [Int]
      jwt pad key bytes bs idx =
        | idx >= 64 = []
        | bs == [] = [0] :: (jwt pad key bytes [] (idx + 1))
        | otherwise = jwt pad key head bs idx

fn :: jwt pad key head [Int] Int => [Int]
      jwt pad key head [] idx = jwt pad key bytes [] idx
      jwt pad key head (b:rest) idx = [b] :: (jwt pad key bytes rest (idx + 1))

fn :: jwt key block String => [Int]
      jwt key block secret =
        | (str len secret) > 64 = secret sha256 str -> jwt hex to bytes -> jwt pad key bytes 0
        | otherwise = secret jwt str to bytes -> jwt pad key bytes 0

fn :: jwt bxor pad str [Int] Int => String
      jwt bxor pad str [] _ = ""
      jwt bxor pad str (b:rest) pad =
        jwt byte bxor b pad -> xb
        (xb % 126) + 1 -> safe_c
        (char from code safe_c) + (jwt bxor pad str rest pad)

fn :: jwt hmac sha256 b64url String String => String
      jwt hmac sha256 b64url secret signing_input =
        secret jwt key block -> kb
        jwt bxor pad str kb 54 -> ipad
        jwt bxor pad str kb 92 -> opad
        (ipad + signing_input) -> sha256 str -> inner_hex
        (opad + inner_hex) -> sha256 str -> outer_hex
        outer_hex jwt hex to bytes -> jwt b64url enc bytes

fn :: jwt hs256 header json Int => String
      jwt hs256 header json _ = '{"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"}'

fn :: jwt sign hs256 String String => String
      jwt sign hs256 payload_json secret =
        jwt hs256 header json 0 -> jwt b64url encode -> hdr_b64
        payload_json jwt b64url encode -> pay_b64
        hdr_b64 + "." + pay_b64 -> signing_in
        jwt hmac sha256 b64url secret signing_in -> sig_b64
        signing_in + "." + sig_b64

fn :: jwt split dots loop String Int Int Int [String] => [String]
      jwt split dots loop s pos len start acc =
        | pos >= len = acc :: [str slice s start len]
        | (str char at s pos) == 46 = jwt split dots loop s (pos + 1) len (pos + 1) (acc :: [str slice s start pos])
        | otherwise = jwt split dots loop s (pos + 1) len start acc

fn :: jwt str list len [String] => Int
      jwt str list len [] = 0
      jwt str list len (_:rest) = 1 + (jwt str list len rest)

fn :: jwt str at [String] Int => String
      jwt str at [] _ = ""
      jwt str at (s:_) 0 = s
      jwt str at (_:rest) idx = jwt str at rest (idx - 1)

fn :: jwt decode payload String => JwtRes
      jwt decode payload token =
        jwt split dots loop token 0 (str len token) 0 [] -> parts
        jwt decode parts parts

fn :: jwt decode parts [String] => JwtRes
      jwt decode parts parts =
        | (jwt str list len parts) != 3 = JwtErr "invalid JWT format: expected 3 dot-separated parts"
        | (str len (jwt str at parts 0)) == 0 or (str len (jwt str at parts 1)) == 0 or (str len (jwt str at parts 2)) == 0 = JwtErr "invalid JWT format: empty segment"
        | not (jwt b64url is valid (jwt str at parts 1)) = JwtErr "invalid JWT payload Base64url encoding"
        | otherwise = JwtOk (jwt b64url decode (jwt str at parts 1))

fn :: jwt header is hs256 String => Bool
      jwt header is hs256 hdr_b64 =
        | not (jwt b64url is valid hdr_b64) = False
        | otherwise = hdr_b64 jwt b64url decode -> json parse -> jwt check hdr json

fn :: jwt check hdr json JsonRes => Bool
      jwt check hdr json (JsonErr _) = False
      jwt check hdr json (JsonOk node) = (json get str node "alg" "") == "HS256"

fn :: jwt verify hs256 String String => JwtRes
      jwt verify hs256 token secret =
        jwt split dots loop token 0 (str len token) 0 [] -> parts
        jwt verify parts parts secret

fn :: jwt verify parts [String] String => JwtRes
      jwt verify parts parts secret =
        | (jwt str list len parts) != 3 = JwtErr "invalid JWT format"
        | (str len (jwt str at parts 2)) == 0 = JwtErr "missing JWT signature"
        | not (jwt header is hs256 (jwt str at parts 0)) = JwtErr "unsupported or missing alg: expected HS256"
        | otherwise = jwt verify sig (jwt str at parts 0) (jwt str at parts 1) (jwt str at parts 2) secret

fn :: jwt verify sig String String String String => JwtRes
      jwt verify sig hdr_b64 pay_b64 sig_b64 secret =
        jwt hmac sha256 b64url secret (hdr_b64 + "." + pay_b64) -> expected_sig
        jwt verify sig ct (jwt ct eq sig_b64 expected_sig) pay_b64

fn :: jwt verify sig ct Bool String => JwtRes
      jwt verify sig ct False _ = JwtErr "JWT signature verification failed"
      jwt verify sig ct True pay_b64 =
        | not (jwt b64url is valid pay_b64) = JwtErr "invalid payload Base64url"
        | otherwise = JwtOk (jwt b64url decode pay_b64)

34.4.4. Barne-inplementazioa: Structured Claims Signing & Temporal Validation

Ikusi nola jwt.rg-ek lehenik fn :: ... => ... sinadurak egituratzen dituen eta kasu bakoitza lerrokatutako ekuazioen eta isats-deien bidez ebazten duen:

fn :: jwt sign claims JwtClaims String => String
      jwt sign claims c secret =
        JsonObj [JsonField "iss" (JsonStr (issuer c)), JsonField "sub" (JsonStr (subject c)), JsonField "exp" (JsonInt (expires_at c)), JsonField "nbf" (JsonInt (not_before_at c)), JsonField "custom" (JsonStr (custom_json c))] -> base_obj
        jwt sign hs256 (json stringify base_obj) secret

fn :: jwt verify claims String String Int => JwtClaimsRes
      jwt verify claims token secret now =
        jwt verify hs256 token secret -> vres
        jwt validate verified payload vres now

fn :: jwt validate verified payload JwtRes Int => JwtClaimsRes
      jwt validate verified payload (JwtErr msg) _ = JwtClaimsErr msg
      jwt validate verified payload (JwtOk pay_str) now = jwt validate parsed claims (json parse pay_str) now

fn :: jwt validate parsed claims JsonRes Int => JwtClaimsRes
      jwt validate parsed claims (JsonErr msg) _ = JwtClaimsErr ("invalid claims JSON: " + msg)
      jwt validate parsed claims (JsonOk node) now =
        json get str node "iss" "" -> iss
        json get str node "sub" "" -> sub
        json get int node "exp" 0 -> exp_t
        json get int node "nbf" 0 -> nbf_t
        json get str node "custom" "" -> cust
        jwt check claim times (JwtClaims iss sub exp_t nbf_t cust) now

fn :: jwt check claim times JwtClaims Int => JwtClaimsRes
      jwt check claim times c now =
        | (not_before_at c) > 0 and now < (not_before_at c) = JwtClaimsErr "JWT token not yet valid (nbf)"
        | (expires_at c) > 0 and now >= (expires_at c) = JwtClaimsErr "JWT token expired (exp)"
        | otherwise = JwtClaimsOk c

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34.5. Berme algoritmikoak, RMM1/RMM2 memoria eta jwt-en Urrezko 5 Arauak

• Berme algoritmikoa eta segurtasunekoa: "alg":"none" erasoaren aurkako immunitate osoa (alg zehazki "HS256" ez duen edozein goiburuk JwtBadSignature itzultzen du) eta sinaduraren denbora konstanteko konparazioa.
• $O(1)$ pila-konplexutasuna TCOrekin: src/main/ridgun/lib/jwt.rg-eko begizta errekurtsibo guztiak isats-posizioan daude; beraz, ridgunc-ek pila-hazkuntzarik gabeko jauzi natiboetara konpilatzen ditu.
• Memoria determinista (RMM1/RMM2): Zero zabor-biltzaile etenaldi; tarteko egitura guztiak modu deterministan askatzen dira esparrutik irtetean.
• Etengabeko egiaztapena: Zorrotz probatua stable check eta src/test/ridgun/test jwt.rg suite automatizatuaren bidez.

jwt-ekin programatzeko Urrezko 5 Arauak

1. Deklaratu import jwt fitxategiaren hasieran eta baliatu zuriuneen eta azpimarren arteko baliokidetasuna zure kodea prosa bezala irakur dadin.
2. Lerrokatu zure datu-hodiak = ikurrarekin: kateatu jwt-erako deiak izen propioko urratsetan eta utzi stable format-i zutabeak lerrokatzen.
3. Baliatu jwt-eko funtzio osoak zure | guardetan: egiaztatu itzulera-balioak edo askatu ADTak pattern matching bidez, kanpoko sarrera beti baliozkoa dela suposatu beharrean.
4. Saihestu egitura handiak kopiatzea eremu bat kontsultatu besterik behar ez baduzu: gogoratu RMM2-n sarrerako argumentuek ez dituztela kontagailuak handitzen edo txikitzen (+0 / -0).
5. Konbinatu jwt eta test (import test): idatzi beti asertzioak assert equals edo assert true erabiliz zure domeinuaren inbarianteak finkatzeko.

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35. kapituluan socket lib-a sakonki esploratuko dugu (socket lib-a — TCP, UDP, AF_UNIX, Framing, RFC 1035 DNS eta Kernel Socketak (RGF-001)).